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Truman P. Thomas: The Rise of Informed Refusal
Truman v. Thomas addresses the issue of whether or not a physician must
inform a patient of the possible consequences of her refusal to submit to a
diagnostic test. The California Supreme Court has determined that a phy-
sician has such a duty, and the author provides an examination of this de-
cision and a view of previous case law in the area of informed consent.
Although increasing the physician's burden of disclosure, the decision can
be seen as a continuation of the trend of cases allowing patients more con-
trol over the care of their own bodies.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Truman v. Thomas,' the California Supreme Court ruled that
a physician may be held liable for the failure to warn a patient of
the dangers involved in refusing to undergo a diagnostic test.
This ruling has expanded the duty of a physician to disclose infor-
mation to his patient.2 Preyiously, when a physician proposed a
treatment or surgical procedure to a patient and the patient con-
sented, the physician was required to explain to the patient any
possible consequences of such treatment or procedure. Following
the Truman decision, when a patient refuses to consent to a test-
ing procedure the physician must explain the possible conse-
quences of an undetected illness.
Considering the trend of the case law in California, Truman
may be viewed, not so much as changing prior law on informed
consent, but as a further expansion of the doctrine. This is evi-
dent from the emphasis placed on a patient's right to know and
decide on the ultimate treatment of his own body. Thus, Truman
is an expansion of patient rights.
In analyzing the California Supreme Court's decision in Truman
v. Thomas, this note will examine the history of the doctrine of
informed consent, and how it has evolved from an action of bat-
tery, to its present day interpretation as part of the fiduciary rela-
tionship which exists between physician and patient. Cobb v.
Grant,3 relied upon by the supreme court in deciding Truman,
will be examined, as well as prior California case law. Finally, the
impact of the ruling in Truman will be examined to delineate the
1. 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980).
2. Id. at 298, 611 P.2d at 909, 165 Cal. Rptr. 315 (Clark, J., dissenting).
3. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
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extent that a physician must disclose any consequences of refus-
ing a diagnostic test.
II. CASE HISTORY
A. Facts
The defendant in Truman, Dr. Claude R. Thomas, was the phy-
sician of the deceased, Rena Truman. Dr. Thomas saw Mrs. Tru-
man frequently during the period between 1964 and 1969. Mrs.
Truman first went to see Dr. Thomas in connection with her sec-
ond pregnancy. Upon her initial visit, Mrs. Truman informed Dr.
Thomas that she had undergone a pap smear within the past
year.
Between 1964 and 1969 Dr. Thomas never performed a pap
smear4 on Mrs. Truman. She saw him periodically and even dis-
cussed personal matters with him. On several occasions Dr.
Thomas requested Mrs. Truman to submit to a pap smear. Mrs.
Truman repeatedly declined, refusing him permission to adminis-
ter the test.5 On one occasion, when Dr. Thomas asked Mrs. Tru-
man if she would undergo a pap smear, she responded that she
could not afford it.6 Dr. Thomas offered to defer payment; how-
ever, Mrs. Truman insisted on paying cash.
At no time while Mrs. Truman was Dr. Thomas's patient did Dr.
Thomas specifically inform her of the risks involved in failing to
undergo a pap smear test. He did, however, repeatedly recom-
mend that she have one.
In 1969 Mrs. Truman saw Dr. Thomas for a urinary tract infec-
tion. He treated her and told her to return for a complete exami-
nation, which she failed to do. Subsequently, she went to a
urologist who noticed that she had a heavy vaginal discharge and
recommended that she see a gynecologist. When she did not
make an appointment with one, the urologist made one for her.
In October, 1969, the gynecologist, Dr. Ritter, diagnosed Mrs.
Truman as having cervical cancer. The cancer was too far ad-
4. The vaginal pap smear has been called "a popular technique for hormonal
evaluation since it is simple to perform, easy to learn, inexpensive, rapid, harm-
less, and does not cause discomfort to the patient." 1 J. ScIAJRA, GYNECOLOGY
AND OBSTETRICS 11 (1977).
5. At one point Dr. Thomas refused to give Mrs. Truman any birth control
pills unless she came in for an examination and a pap smear. Although he finally
gave her the pills without doing the smear, he later told the pharmacist to tell her
she couldn't have any more until she had an examination. After this, Dr. Thomas
prescribed no more birth control pills for Mrs. Truman, as she never had the ex-
amination. Truman v. Thomas, 93 Cal. App. 3d 304, 308-09, 155 Cal. Rptr. 752, 754
(1979).
6. Id. at 309, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 754. The cost of a pap smear at the time was
$6.00.
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vanced for surgery. Because other forms of treatment failed, Mrs.
Truman died of the cancer in July, 1970, at the age of 30. Expert
testimony revealed that if Mrs. Truman had received a pap smear
during the period between 1964 and 1969, the cervical cancer
would probably have been discovered in time to save her life.
B. Outcome in Lower Courts
An action for medical malpractice against Dr. Thomas was
brought by Mrs. Truman's two minor children for the wrongful
death of their mother. The plaintiffs contended that Dr. Thomas
had breached a duty of care to the decedent in failing to inform
her of the risks in not consenting to a pap smear.
At the trial level, the jury rendered a special verdict, which
found that there had been no negligence on the part of Dr.
Thomas which had caused Mrs. Truman's death. The plaintiffs
appealed on three grounds: first, that the trial court had errone-
ously refused to permit the plaintiffs to impeach Dr. Thomas's
testimony with the use of a prior criminal conviction and with evi-
dence of prior willful falsehood; secondly, that the trial court
should have instructed the jury on the doctrine of Helling v. Ca-
rey;7 and thirdly, that the trial court erroneously refused to in-
struct the jury on the doctrine of informed consent.
The California Court of Appeal for the Third District rejected
each of the plaintiffs' grounds for appeal and affirmed the trial
court.8
III. HISTORY OF THE ACTION
It has long been established that a physician needs the consent
of a patient before he may perform an operation. As early as 1767,
the King's Bench held:
[I]t was improper to disunite the callous without consent; this is the us-
age and law of surgeons: then it was ignorance and unskilfulness in that
very particular, to do contrary to the rule of the profession, what no sur-
geon ought to have done; and indeed it is reasonable that a patient should
be told what is about to be done to him, that he may take courage and put
himself in such a situation as to enable him to undergo the operation.9
7. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974). See notes 42-56 infra and accompany-
ing text.
8. 93 Cal. App. 3d 304, 155 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1979).
9. Slater v. Baker, 95 Eng. Rep. 860, 862 (K.B. 1767) (a surgeon experimented
without the patient's consent by stretching the patient's newly healed broken leg
with an instrument).
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In this century, early cases such as Robinson v. Crotwell,O re-
lied on a consent theory to impose liability. In Robinson, a physi-
cian was held liable when he contributed to plaintiff's unforeseen
physicial problem by performing a serious operation without the
express or implied consent of the patient.
In 1914, Judge Cardozo stated that "[elvery human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an oper-
ation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which
he is liable in damages."'"
Thus, the concept that a physician must obtain consent before
performing an operation or treatment has become entrenched in
the law.12 The next step in the evolution of the doctrine of in-
formed consent came when the courts realized that consent
would not be valid unless the patient knew the extent of the pro-
cedures to which he was consenting. This development was an-
nounced as early as 1915, in the case of Zoterell v. Repp where the
court instructed the jury that "consent must be with knowledge
and understanding of the operation itself."' 3
Once the informed consent doctrine was established, however,
there was confusion as to the basis for its use. The cases were
tried on both battery' 4 and negligence theories.1i
10. 175 Ala. 194, 57 So. 23 (1911).
11. Schloendorff v. Soc'y. of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914).
12. See also Edwards v. Roberts, 12 Ga. App. 140, 76 S.E. 1054 (1913) (surgeon
unnecessarily removed patient's left ovary against her express desires); Hively v.
Higgs, 120 Or. 588, 253 P. 363 (1927) (removal of tonsils during an operation on the
septum of patient's nose).
13. Zoterell v. Repp, 187 Mich. 319, 324, 153 N.W. 692, 694 (1915).
14. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. In Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal.
App. 3d 790, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1969), the patient had no knowledge of the full nature
of a myelogram and believed from the doctor's explanation that the procedure was
purely exploratory. The patient claimed he would not have consented to a spinal
injection. As a result of the spinal injection, which is included in a myelogram, he
suffered a weakness in dorsiflexion of the left foot, commonly called foot drop. In
Corn v. French, 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173 (1955), the patient signed a consent form
permitting the doctor to perform a mastectomy. However, the plaintiff did not
know the meaning of the word "mastectomy" and the doctor orally stated that he
was only going to make a test of the breast. In reversing the trial court's decision,
the Nevada Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had a right to a jury decision on
whether or not her consent was repudiated.
In Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 663 (1966), the patient signed a con-
sent form for exploratory surgery on his back. The patient understood "explora-
tory" to mean he would be examined only and no effort would be made to correct
any disorder. In finding for the plaintiff, who suffered paralysis when the doctor
did more than explore, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held it is no defense
for a surgeon to show the patient had given consent when he did not understand
the true nature of the operation.
In Belcher v. Carter, 13 Ohio App. 2d 113, 234 N.E.2d 311 (1967), the plaintiff filed
an action for negligence and battery, alleging the physicians failed to inform her of
1070
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In Cobbs v. Grant,16 the California Supreme Court established
the approach under California law. The Court's opinion stated:
The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a
doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.
When the patient gives permission to perform one type of treatment and
the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to
deviate from the consent given is present. However, when the patient
consents to certain treatments and the doctor performs that treatment but
an undisclosed and inherent complication with a low probability occurs,
no intentional deviation from the consent given appears; rather, the doctor
in obtaining consent may have failed to meet his due care duty to disclose
pertinent information. In that situation the action should be pleaded in
negligence.
17
Thus, unless a physician performs an operation for which he
has not received the patient's consent, the California courts will
proceed under a negligence theory. Based upon this approach, it
has been found that "the inadvertent failure to disclose a risk of
great likelihood could result in battery, while an intentional fail-
ure to disclose a remote risk would constitute, at most, negli-
gence."' 8
In California, Cobbs is presently the leading case on the subject
of informed consent.19 California has no statutory provisions 20
governing informed consent, and relies solely on case law.
the danger of radiation treatments due to hypersensitivity to X-rays. The court
upheld the trial court's dismissal of the petition for failing to comply with an order
requiring the plaintiff to separately state the cause of action.
15. See also Kessenick & Menkin, Medical Malpractice: The Right to be In-
formed, 8 U.S.F. L. REV. 261 (1973); Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 381 (1971) (the plaintiff claimed the physician failed to warn her of the possi-
bility of a pulmonary embolism when he administered a drug to her, and in up-
holding the trial court's granting of a nonsuit, it was held that the failure to
establish the existence and scope of duty of disclosure by expert testimony was
necessary for an action based on informed consent) Plante, An Analysis of In-
formed Consent, 36 FORDHAM L REV. 639 (1968).
16. 8 Cal. 3d 299, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
17. Id. at 240-41, 502 P.2d at 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
18. Kessenick & Mankin, Medical Malpractice: The Right to be Informed, 8
U.S.F. L. REV. 261, 264 (1973).
19. See notes 61-69 infra and accompanying text.
20. Many states have statutory provisions governing informal consent: Amz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-561 (1957-79 Supp.); Florida Medical Consent Law, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.46 (West Supp. 1980); Georgia Medical Consent Law, GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 88-2901 to 2907 (1979); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4301 to 4306 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, § 81-2312 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.137 (Supp. 1980-81);
KY. REV. STAT. § 304.40-320 (Supp. 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § R.S. 40: 1299.40
(West 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2816-2820 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41 A.110, 120
(1957); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW, § 2805-d (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-
21.13 (Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-05 (1959); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2317.54 (Page Supp. 1979); ORE. REV. STAT. § 677.097 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-
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In a 1939 case, Valdez v. Percy,2 1 the court of appeal addressed
the issue of requiring consent for surgery. The case turned on the
negligence of the doctor in performing the surgery, but the court
observed that "where a person has been subjected to an operation
without his consent such an operation constitutes technical as-
sault and battery."22
Another example of California's treatment of informed consent
came in 1951 in the case of Simone v. Sabo.23 In Simone, a dentist
was charged with negligence for severing the patient's mandibu-
lar nerve while extracting an impacted tooth. The patient also
charged that the dentist did not warn him of the possibility of
such an occurrence before the operation. The appellate court
ruled that the dentist was not negligent and reversed. The court,
however, failed to address the issue of whether the patient had
been adequately informed despite the fact that testimony re-
vealed that "dentists 'usually do advise' patients of the danger of
traumatizing a nerve in extracting the tooth in question and
stated that the nerve is injured in about 25 per cent of such ex-
tractions."24 The dissent believed that this was an important fact
and that the jury's finding of liability should have been allowed to
stand.25
In Salgo v. Stanford University Board of Trustees,26 the court of
appeal considered the issue of informed consent more fully. The
court held that a physician must disclose to the patient all the
facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent con-
sent. The physician "may not minimize the known dangers of a
procedure or operation in order to induce . .. consent ... [and
he] must place the welfare of his patient above all else."27 The
court, however, refrained from requiring complete disclosure of
all risks and gave the physician some discretion depending on the
patient's particular case.2 8
3417 (Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909
(Supp. 1980).
21. 35 Cal. App. 2d 485, 96 P.2d 142 (1939).
22. Id. at 491, 96 P.2d at 145, (citing Hively v. Higgs, 120 Or. 588, 253 P. 363
(1927)).
23. 37 Cal. 2d 253, 231 P.2d 19 (1951).
24. Id. at 262, 231 P.2d at 25 (Carter, J., dissenting).
25. Id.
26. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957) (doctor did not inform patient of
the risk of paralysis in an aortography).
27. Id. at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
28. The reasons the court gave for this was that a disclosure to the patient of:
felvery risk attendant upon any surgical procedure or operation, no mat-
ter how remote; ... may well result in alarming a patient who is already
unduly apprehensive and who may as a result refuse to undertake surgery
in which there is in fact minimal risk; it may also result in actually in-
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In Dunlap v. Marine,29 the court of appeal held that "the ques-
tion of such consent turns on the issue of whether the physician
was then acting in conformity with recognized practices in the
community."30 This standard was later repudiated in Berkey v.
Anderson.31 In Berkey, the court stated that the fiduciary nature
of the relationship between physician and patient will not permit
the medical profession to determine its own responsibilities. 32
Berkey became the leading case in California on informed con-
sent and its rationale was followed in subsequent cases. 33 A year
after Berkey, Dow v. Kaiser Foundation34 was decided. Dow
elaborated on the matter of causation in an informed consent
case. It stated that "the plaintiff must establish as part of his bur-
den of proof that the information which was withheld was of such
significance that had it been disclosed, consent would hot have
been given."35 Thus, a patient must prove that if he had been
fully informed, he would not have consented.3 6
creasing the risks by reasons of the physiological results of the apprehen-
sion itself.
Id.
29. 242 Cal. App. 2d 162, 51 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1966). The patient suffered a cardiac
arrest as a result of an injection of a spinal anesthetic. The court held that there
was no deviation from the standard of practice in the community in obtaining the
patient's consent.
30. Id. at 177, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
31. 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1969).
32. The court stated:
We cannot agree that the matter of informed consent must be determined
on the basis of medical testimony any more than that expert testimony of
the standard practice is determinative in any other case involving a fiduci-
ary relationship. We agree with appellant that a physician's duty to dis-
close is not governed by the standard practice of the physician's
community, but is a duty imposed by law which governs his conduct in
the same manner as others in a similar fiduciary relationship. To hold
otherwise would permit the medical profession to determine its own re-
sponsibilities to the patients in a manner of considerable public interest.
Id. at 805, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
33. See Rainer v. Community Memorial Hosp. 18 Cal. App. 3d 240, 95 Cal. Rptr.
901 (1971); Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971); Puten-
sen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1970); Dow v.
Permanente Medical Group, 12 Cal. App. 3d 488, 90 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1970).
34. 12 Cal. App. 3d 488, 90 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1970). The patient claimed that an
operation to perform an anterior interbody fusion that resulted in injury to major
blood vessels was performed without her informed consent. The court said that
the confidence growing out of the doctor-patient relationship imposed upon the
physician the duty to refrain from fraudulent concealment.
35. Id. at 506, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
36. The court also observed that "this cause of action arises even in the most
skillfully performed, successful operations where the 'injury' is nothing more than
1073
The foregoing cases comprise the law of informed consent in
California. It is upon these cases that the supreme court relied in
deciding Cobbs. Subsequently, the supreme court relied almost
exclusively upon Cobbs in deciding Truman v. Thomas.
IV. THE SUPREME CouRT's ANALYSIS
A. Refusal to Admit Prior Conviction into Evidence
At the trial level, the plaintiffs attempted to introduce evidence
of a prior criminal conviction of Dr. Thomas. Dr. Thomas had
been convicted in Utah in June, 1976, for falsifying a prescription
to obtain a controlled drug for his own use. The trial court re-
fused to admit this evidence and plaintiffs appealed.
The supreme court upheld the trial court's ruling. It held that a
foreign conviction may not be admitted into evidence for im-
peachment purposes unless it is shown to be a felony under the
law of the jurisdiction in which it was sustained.37 Under Utah
law, Dr. Thomas's crime was considered a felony,38 but Utah law
also provided that the felony could be reduced to a misdemeanor
if the sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on proba-
tion.39 Dr. Thomas was placed on probation, which was subse-
quently terminated, thereby reducing the felony to a
misdemeanor.40 Thus, the supreme court found the evidence
inadmissible under the California Evidence Code.4 1
the performance of the operation itself." Id. The court pointed out that litigation
will usually only occur when the surgery is unsatisfactory or an unanticipated re-
sult occurs. Id. This would seem to indicate that if the risks were not disclosed,
even if the operation was a complete success, a physician could still be liable for
failing to get an informed consent.
37. The California Evidence Code states:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, it may be shown
by the examination of the witness or by the record of the judgment that
he has been convicted of a felony unless: ...
(d) The conviction was under the laws of another jurisdiction and the
witness has been relieved of the penalties and disabilities arising from
the conviction pursuant to a procedure substantially equivalent to that re-
ferred to in subdivision (b) or (c).
CAL. EviD. CODE § 788 (West 1966).
38. Utah Annotated Code § 58-37-8, subdivision (4) (a) provides that "[iIt shall
be unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: . . . (ii) To acquire or ob-
tain possession.., of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery,
deception or subterfuge." UTAH ANN. CODE § 58-37-8 (a) (ii) (1953).
39. UTAH CaUM. CODE § 76-3-402 (2) (b):
(2) Whenever a conviction is for a felony, the conviction shall be deemed
to be a misdemeanor if: . . . (b) The imposition of the sentence is stayed
and the defendant if placed on probation, whether committed to jail as a
condition of probation or not, and he is thereafter discharged without vio-
lating his probation.
40. See note 39 supra.
41. See note 37 upra.
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B. Refusal to Allow Helling v. Carey Instruction
The second ground for the plaintiffs' appeal was the trial court's
rejection of a proposed jury instruction. Plaintiffs requested the
jury to be instructed that "as a matter of law.., a physician who
fails to perform a pap smear test on a female patient over the age
of 23 and to whom the patient has entrusted her general physical
care is liable for injury or death proximately caused by the failure
to perform the test."4 The supreme court upheld the trial court's
refusal to give this instruction.
In support of this jury instruction, the -plaintiffs relied on the
case of Helling v. Carey,43 decided by the Washington Supreme
Court. The California Supreme Court distinguished Helling from
the Truman case. In Helling, a physician failed to recommend a
glaucoma test for a person under forty years old." In rejecting
Helling, the California Supreme Court stated: "[T]he suggestion
that a physician must perform a test on a patient, who is capable
of deciding whether to undergo the proposed procedure, is di-
rectly contrary to the principle that it is the patient who must ul-
timately decide which medical procedure to undergo."45
The court of appeal, which also upheld the trial court's ruling
on this instruction,4 stated that given the "activity involved in
taking a pap smear sample[,] traditional legal (and moral)
precepts emphatically dictate that it may not be taken nonconsen-
sually."47
The only other case in California to address Helling was Barton
v. Owen.48 In Barton, the court held that Helling v. Carey did not
state the law in California49 except insofar as Helling stated that
custom in the community was not the absolute standard to be ap-
42. 27 Cal. 3d at 290, 611 P.2d at 905, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
43. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
44. The Washington Supreme Court ruled that it was negligence as a matter of
law for the doctor to fail to give the simple, harmless pressure test to the plaintiff.
The court found this despite the fact that the standards of the opthalmology pro-
fession do not require such a test until after the patient is 40 years old. Id. at 519,
519 P.2d at 983.
45. 27 Cal. 3d at 295-96, 611 P.2d at 908, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
46. 93 Cal. App. 3d 304, 155 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1979).
47. Id. at 311, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 755.
48. 71 Cal. App. 3d 484, 139 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1977) (as the result of various negli-
gent acts and omissions on the part of his physicians in the treatment of an acute
frontal sinusitis condition, plaintiff underwent a prefrontal lobotomy for a brain
abscess).
49. Id. at 498, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
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plied in determining the issue of negligence. 50
In Helling, the failure to give a pressure test was negligence as
a matter of law.5 1 In rejecting this approach, the Barton court
stated that "in calling for negligence as a matter of law, the plain-
tiff is in reality trying to get us to expand the concept of strict lia-
bility in tort to the services rendered by a doctor."52 California
courts had already stated that strict liability should not apply
where services had been rendered, but should only apply when
there had been the sale of a product.5 3 Because California had re-
jected the holding in Helling, the instruction proposed by plain-
tiffs was properly refused.
It should also be noted that the Helling ruling has been limited
in the state of Washington. In Meeks v. Marx,54 the Washington
Court of Appeals held that "[a] thorough analysis of that decision
leads us to conclude the holding there was intended to be re-
stricted solely to its own unique facts, i.e., cases in which an
opthalmologist is alleged to have failed to test for glaucoma under
the same or similar circumstances." 55 Further, the rule an-
nounced in Helling was abolished by the Washington Legisla-
ture.5 6 The purpose of its legislation was to reestablish the pre-
Helling standard.5 7
50. Id. at 493, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
51. See note 43 supra.
52. 71 Cal. App. 3d at 498, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
53. Id. at 498, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 502. See also Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp.,
Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973).
54. 15 Wash. App. 571, 550 P.2d 1158 (1976). /
55. Id. at 575, 550 P.2d at 1162. See also Swanson v. Brigham, 18 Wash. App.
647, 571 P.2d 217 (1977).
56. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.290 (Supp. 1980) provides:
In any civil action for damages based on professional negligence against a
hospital which is licensed by the state of Washington or against the per-
sonnel of any such hospital, or against a member of the healing arts in-
cluding, but not limited to, a physician licensed under chapter 18.71 RCW,
an osteopathic physician licensed under chapter 18.57 RCW, a chiroprac-
tor licensed under chapter 18.25 RCW, a dentist licensed under chapter
18.32 RCW, a podiatrist licensed under chapter 18.22 RCW, or a nurse li-
censed under chapters 18.78 or 18.88 RCE, the plaintiff in order to prevail
shall be required to prove by a-preponderance of the evidence that the de-
fendant or defendants failed to exercise that degree of skill, care and
learning possessed by other persons in the same profession and that a
proximate result of such failure the plaintiff suffered damages, but in no
event shall the provisions of this section apply to an action based on the
failure to obtain the informed consent of a patient.
57. Physicians and Surgeons-Malpractice-Court Disregard for the Standard
of the Profession-The Legislative Response-Helling v. Carey, 83 Wh. 2d 514, 519
P.2d 981 (1974); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.290 (Supp. 1975), 51 WASH. L REv. 167
(1975). 'The purpose of this statute was to nullify the Helling decision and rees-
tablish the pre-Helling standards of negligence in medical malpractice cases." Id.
at 168.
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C. Refusal to Instruct
The third ground for the plaintiffs' appeal in Truman was the
trial court's refusal to give the plaintiffs' second proposed jury in-
struction. The focal point of Truman is the supreme court's rever-
sal of the trial court's ruling on this issue.
The plaintiffs desired the jury to be instructed as follows:
It is the duty of a physician to disclose to his patient all relevant informa-
tion to enable the patient to make an informed decision regarding the sub-
mission to or refusal to take a diagnostic test.
Failure of the physician to disclose to his patient all relevant informa-
tion including the risks to the patient if the test is refused renders the
physician liable for any injury legally resulting from the patient's refusal
to take the test if a reasonably prudent person in the patient's position
would not have refused the test if she had been adequately informed of all
the significant perils.5 8
This instruction is similar to one found in BAJI.59
Under this instruction, a physician has the duty to inform the
patient of the risks involved in refusing to take a diagnostic test.6 0
58. 27 Cal. 3d at 290, 611 P.2d at 904-05, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 310-11.
59. BAJI No. 6.11 (6th ed. Rev. 1977) states:
Except as hereinafter explained, it is the duty of the physician or surgeon
to disclose to his patient all relevant information to enable the patient to
make an informed decision regarding the proposed operation or treat-
ment.
There is no duty to make disclosure of risks when the patient requests
that he not be so informed or where the procedure is simple and the dan-
ger remote and commonly understood to be remote.
Likewise, there is no duty to discuss minor risks inherent in common
procedures, when such procedures very seldom result in serious ill effects.
However, when a procedure inherently involves a known risk of death
or serious bodily harm, it is the physician's or surgeon's duty to disclose
to his patient the possibility of such outcome and to explain in lay terms
the complications that might possible occur. The physician or surgeon
must also disclose such additional information as a skilled practitioner of
good standing would provide under the same or similar circumstances.
A physician or surgeon has no duty of disclosure beyond that required
of physicians and surgeons of good standing in the same or similar locality
when he relied upon facts which would demonstrate to a reasonable man
that the disclosure would so seriously upset the patient that the patient
would not have been able to rationally weigh the risks of refusing to un-
dergo the recommended (treatment) (operation).
Even though the patient has consented to a proposed treatment or oper-
ation, the failure of the physician or surgeon to inform the patient as
stated in this instruction before obtaining such consent in negligence and
renders the physician or surgeon subject to libility for any injury (proxi-
mately) (legally) resulting from the (treatment) (operation) if a reason-
ably prudent person to the patient's position would not have consented to
the (treatment) (operation) if he had been adequately informed of all sig-
nificant perils.
60. 27 Cal. 3d at 298, 611 P.2d at 910, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 316 (Clark, J., dissenting).
According to the dissent "[tihe burden of explaining the purpose of a pap smear
1077
This would be a great expansion of the physician's duty to dis-
close. In Truman, the supreme court held that a physician has
such a duty.61
The supreme court's opinion, written by Chief Justice Bird, re-
lied primarily on the case of Cobbs v. Grant.62 Cobbs is presently
the leading case in California on the doctrine of informed consent,
being the first case on the subject decided by the California
Supreme Court.63
The court in Cobbs64 ruled that because of the nature of physi-
cian-patient relationship, 65 a physician must obtain consent from
the patient before performing any treatment or procedure.
In order to obtain an informed consent a physician must di-
vulge "to his patient all information relevant to a meaningful deci-
sional process." 66 Thus, the scope of a physician's duty to disclose
may be seen to include any material information which the physi-
cian knows, or should know, would be regarded as significant by a
reasonable person in the patient's position when deciding to ac-
cept or reject a treatment.67 Although the California court did not
and the potential risks in failing to submit to one may not appear to be great, but
the newly imposed duty upon physicians created by today's majority opinion goes
far beyond." Id.
61. Id. at 294, 611 P.2d at 907, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
62. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
63. Kessenick & Mankin, Medical Malpractice: The Right to be Informed, 8
U.S.F. L. REV. 261 (1973).
64. The facts of the case are that Cobbs was hospitalized for the treatment of a
duodenal ulcer. Surgery was indicated and his family doctor advised him in gen-
eral terms of the risks of undergoing a general anesthetic. The surgeon informed
Cobbs of the nature of the operation but not of the inherent risks. Nine days after
the successful surgery Cobbs had severe abdominal pain and returned to the hos-
pital and had to have his spleen removed. Spleen injury is an event what happens
five percent of the time in such operations. Later, Cobbs had severe stomach
pains, returned to the hospital and had 50 percent of his stomach removed. Later
he had to return again to the hospital for internal bleeding due to premature ab-
sorption of a suture. These occurrences are inherent risks of the surgery, of which
Cobbs was never informed. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1972).
65. The Cobbs court stated four postulates concerning the doctor-patient rela-
tionship:
The first is that patients are generally persons unlearned in the medical
sciences and therefore, except in rare cases, courts may safely assume the
knowledge of patient and physician are not in parity. The second is that a
person of adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of
control over his own body, to determine whether or not to submit to law-
ful medical treatment. The third is that the patient's consent to treatment,
to be effective, must be an informed consent. And the fourth is that the
patient, being unlearned in medical sciences, has an abject dependence
upon and trust in his physician for the information upon which he relies
during the decisional process, thus raising an obligation in the physician
that transcends arms-length transactions.
Id. at 242, 502 P.2d at 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
66. Id.
67. 27 Cal. 3d at 291, 611 P.2d at 905, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 311, See also Sard v.
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elaborate on what information would be material, Canterbury v.
Spence,68 a case arising in the District of Columbia, held that to
be material, the information must refer to a hazard which the pa-
tient has not already discovered.
Finally, the Cobbs court held that "as an integral part of the
physician's overall obligation to the patient there is a duty of rea-
sonable disclosure of the available choices with respect to pro-
posed therapy and of the dangers inherently and potentially
involved in each."69 This conclusion can be justified in light of
previous California cases.7 0
The Truman court has now applied the Cobbs rule to circum-
stances where a patient refuses to submit to a test, as well as
where a patient consents to treatment.7 1 The reasoning the court
gave for drawing this application of Cobbs is that the factual dif-
ferences between Cobbs and Truman do not alter the fiducial
qualities of the physician-patient relationship since patients who
reject a procedure are as unskilled in the medical science as
those who consent. 72
The defendant argued that Cobbs was distinguishable and
should only be applied where a patient consents to the recom-
mended procedure. 73 The defendant further argued that the pa-
tient should bear the burden of inquiring further.7 4
The court rejected both arguments as being inconsistent with
Cobbs. It stated that Cobbs imposed a duty to disclose informa-
tion to enable patients to meaningfully exercise their right to
make decisions about their own bodies. This duty is not lessened
because the patient rejects the procedure.7 5
Dr. Thomas also argued that the danger in failing to undergo a
pap smear was remote and commonly appreciated to be remote, 76
and hence, no duty to disclose the risks arose. The court an-
Hardy, 218 Md. App. 432, 444, 379 A.2d 1014, 1022 (1977); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I.
606, 627, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972).
68. 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (where a physician failed to warn the pa-
tient of a 1% risk of paralysis in a laminectomy, the court held he breached the
duty to disclose).
69. 8 Cal. 3d at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
70. See notes 21-36 supra and accompanying text.
71. 27 Cal. 3d at 292, 611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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swered by stating that it is for a jury to decide if a risk is com-
monly known and the danger remote. Based on this reasoning,
the supreme court reversed the trial court's ruling on the refusal
to give the instruction. 77
V. DISSENT
The dissent was written by Justice Clarke who was joined by
Justices Richardson and Manuel. The dissent claimed that "[t] he
consent instruction demanded by plaintiffs [would] impose upon
doctors the intolerable burden of having to explain diagnostic
tests to healthy patients."78 The dissent, thereby, focused on the
greater burden imposed upon physicians by the Truman decision.
The dissent pointed out that society in general was aware that
the purpose of a diagnostic test is to discover an illness, and
therefore, a physician should have no further duty to disclose,79
and should not have to provide a mini-course in medical sci-
ence.8 0 The dissent stated that forcing a physician into a hard-
sell approach to his services might jeopardize the physician-pa-
tient relationship, and speculated that medical costs would rise
because a physician would have to spend more time with a pa-
tient merely to explain medical tests.81
The dissent further asserted that there was nothing in Cobbs
which "warranted imposition of such an onerous duty; to the con-
trary, that case expressly rejected any such duty."82 The facts of
Cobbs,83 including the fact that there had been an actual physical
intrusion, supported a requirement of disclosure, according to the
dissent. Because there was no actual intrusion in Truman, the
dissent felt there was no need for disclosure or consent.84
Based on the foregoing, the dissent concluded that the pro-
posed instruction 85 was deficient and erroneous, and that the trial
judge was under no duty to edit or correct it. Thus, there was no
error in the trial judge's refusal of the instruction and therefore,
no basis for appeal.8 6
77. Id. The court in Cobbs stated that under these circumstances a disclosure
need not be made. 8 Cal. 3d at 245, 502 P.2d at 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
78. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
79. 27 Cal. 3d at 297, 611 P.2d at 909, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 315 (Clark, J., dissenting).
See also note. 76 supra.
80. Id. at 298, 611 P.2d at 910, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 316 (Clark, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 300, 611 P.2d at 911, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 317 (Clark, J., dissenting).
82. See note 79 supra.
83. Id. at 299-300, 611 P.2d at 910, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 316 (Clark, J., dissenting).
84. See note 63 supra.
85. 27 Cal. 3d at 300, 611 P.2d at 911, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 317 (Clark, J., dissenting).
86. See note 59 supra.
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VI. ANALYSIS OF RULING
As the dissenting opinion pointed out, the majority relied al-
most entirely on the decision in Cobbs v. Grant. The main argu-
ment of the defendant, the court of appeal, and of the dissenting
justices was that the facts in Cobbs were distinguishable from the
facts in Truman. In previous cases on the subject of disclosure
and informed consent, no fact situation analogous to that found in
Truman had ever been presented to the court.8 7 There have been
three typical factual patterns for "informed consent" cases. The
first involves physicians who fail to inform patients of inherent
risks in a treatment or surgical procedure.8 8 The second involves
physicians who negligently fail to make a diagnosis or recom-
mend a treatment.89 Finally, the third involves physicians who
perform procedures different from those to which patients have
consented.90
The court of appeal stated that the plaintiffs were attempting to
formulate a doctrine of "informed refusal"91 and refused to im-
87. 27 Cal. 3d at 301-02, 611 P.2d at 911-12, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 317-18 (Clark, J., dis-
senting).
88. 93 Cal. App. 3d at 309, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
89. See, e.g., Ramirez v. United States, 567 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1977) (government
doctor failed to warn patient of risk of granuloma, a hearing loss, in the placement
of a stapes prosthesis in his ear); Walstad v. Univ. of Minn. Hosp., 442 F.2d 635 (8th
Cir. 1971) (physician failed to warn patient of 4% risk of complication from cardiac
catheterization); Slater v. Kehoe, 38 Cal. App. 3d 819, 113 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1974) (pa-
tient not warned of the risk of brachial plexus stretch during the manipulative
treatment of a condition diagnosed as adhesive capsulitis); Berkey v. Anderson, 1
Cal. App. 3d 790, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1969) (doctor did not warn patient of risk of "foot
drop" in myelogram); Rea v. Gaulke, 442 S.W.2d 826 (1969) (doctor failed to dis-
close to his patient the risk of damage to testicles incident to operation for a her-
nia); Govin v. Hunter, 374 P.2d 421 (Wyo. Sup. Ct. 1962) (doctor fails to warn
patient of scars and disfigurement in the correction and stripping of a varicose
vein).
90. See, e.g., Morgan v. Aetna Cas. & Su. Co., 185 F. Supp. 20 (E.D.La. 1960)
(doctor misinformed woman on the state of her pregnancy); Ellis v. Neurological
Assoc. of Tucson, P.C., 118 Ariz. 18, 574 P.2d 486 (1977) (doctor did not operate on
gunshot wound and did not say why he didn't); Foose v. Haymond, 135 Colo. 275,
310 P.2d 722 (1951) (doctor failed to advise patient as to the care that should have
been given to her foot); Sinkey v. Surgical Assoc. 186 N.W.2d 658 (Iowa Sup. Ct.
1971) (doctor misdiagnosed appendicitis as tonsillitis); Downer v. Villeux, 322 A.2d
82 (Me. Sup. Jud. Ct. 1974) (doctor did not disclose alternative to not treating hip
fracture); Ray v. Wagner, 286 Minn. 354, 176 N.W.2d 101 (1970) (failure of doctor to
warn patient that pap smear indicated possible cervical cancer).
91. See, e.g., Moss v. United States, 225 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1955) (patient author-
ized operation on left leg and hip and doctor operated on right leg and hip); Rog-
ers v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 119 So. 2d 649 (La. Ct. App. 1960) (extension of
appendectomy to include removal of female organs); Reddington v. Clayman, 334
pose the duty on physicians to inform patient of the risks in re-
fusing a diagnostic test. The court of appeal so ruled despite the
fact that it found that "informed refusal and informed consent,
once analyzed side by side, are indistinguishable." 92 Its reasoning
in refusing to impose such a duty was that a patient goes to a doc-
tor for advice and aid. Thus, "[ilt is nonsensical to claim that he
goes to the doctor for advice he will not thereafter follow."9-3 The
court also contended that a doctor's advice to submit to a treat-
ment carries with it the unmistakable implication that if the ad-
vice is not followed the consequences to the patient will be
adverse.94
By this reasoning, the appellate court put the burden on the pa-
tient to inquire further. This result would seem to be contrary to,
and inconsistent with, the trend in California requiring greater
physician responsibility for the patient's informed choices. 95
The California Supreme Court held that refusing a diagnostic
test was the same as consenting to a treatment.9 6 The supreme
court stated that the duty of disclosure "applies whether the pro-
cedure involves treatment or a diagnostic test.197 The argument
that there is a difference between treatment and diagnosis was
held to be inconsistent with Cobbs.98
Although originally the doctrine of informed consent was based
on the common law torts of assault and battery99 and later fo-
cused on negligence theory,00 it is readily apparent that the doc-
trine of informed consent as articulated by the Truman court now
places great emphasis on the fiduciary duty'Ol owed by a physi-
cian to a patient. Ultimately, it does not matter whether the pa-
tient is undergoing or refusing treatment. The focal point is not
on the treatment itself, or its acceptance or rejection. The focal
point is on the right of the patient to make an informed choice,
Mass. 244, 134 N.E.2d 920 (1956) (unauthorized extension of tonsillectomy-ade-
noidectomy to a removal of child's uvula); Franklyn v. Peabody, 249 Mich. 363, 228
N.W. 681 (1930) (unauthorized removal of fascia tissue from patient's thigh for use
in authorized operation on her hand); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12
(1905), rev'd on other grounds, Genzel v. Halvorson, 248 Minn. 527, 534, 80 N.W.2d
854, 859 (1957) (patient authorized operation on right ear but physician operated
on the left ear); Moscicki v. Shor, 107 Pa. Super. Ct. 192, 163 A. 341 (1932) (dentist
removed 23 teeth at one time when patient consented to a removal in stages).
92. 93 Cal. App. 3d at 309, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
93. Id. at 311, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 759.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See notes 9-35 supra and accompanying text.
97. 27 Cal. 3d at 292, 611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See notes 11-14 supra and accompanying text.
101. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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and it is the fiducial duty of the physician to disclose all relevant
facts to insure an informed choice.
The arguments that the majority made in the appellate court
and the dissent in the supreme court seem to be very persuasive.
Dr. Thomas repeatedly advised Mrs. Truman to have a pap smear
taken. By doing this, they claim he had done all that should le-
gally required of him. To demand more would pose an intolerable
burden on him. He would be required to deliver a mini-course on
medicine each time a patient refuses to undergo a test and this
would take time away from healing other patients. These argu-
ments are based on the practical aspects of the case. The fiduci-
ary role is put on the doctor by law.102 To not disclose all material
information to one patient because another is waiting is not in the
spirit of a fiduciary.
The dissent makes the points that medical costs will go up be-
cause a physician will now have to spend more time with the pa-
tient explaining tests, 0 3 that the patient should trust his
doctor,104 and that there is no bodily intrusion so there is no need
for consent. 0 5 These points, however, are inconsistent with
Cobbs, as the majority shows. The factual difference, that in one
case there was an actual intrusion while in Truman there was
none, is not controlling. What is controlling is the duty a doctor
has to inform the patient of what is to be done to his body and
why. The purpose of this is so the patient may make an informed
choice on the care of his body.106
In view of these factors, the dissent's arguments of intolerable
burden on physicians and higher costs do not seem to be relevant.
Such arguments focus on the physician's point of view and not
the patient's. The spirit of Cobbs protects and gives to the patient
the right to all the relevant information needed to make an in-
formed choice. The Truman court's extension of the duty to dis-
close appears valid. Although factually different, Cobbs
warranted this result by holding that reasonable familiarity with
the therapeutic alternatives and their hazards was essential to en-
able the patient to chart his course knowledgeably. 0 7
102. See notes 27-36 supra and accompanying text.
103. See note 32 supra.
104. 27 Cal. 3d at 299, 611 P.2d at 910, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 300, 611 P.2d at 911, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
107. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
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VU_. IMPACT
The court in Truman did not state to what detail the physician
must disclose the risk of failing to undergo a diagnostic test. The
dissent claimed that physicians will have to deliver mini-courses
in medical science.108 Yet, this should not be the case as stated in
Cobbs: "the patient's interest in information does not extend to a
lengthy polysyllabic discourse on all possible complications. A
mini-course in medical service is not required .... "109 A diagnos-
tic test could have the aim of uncovering a hundred illnesses or
diseases. A physician would not have to undergo a discussion of
each one to fully disclose the material information a patient
needs to make an informed consent." 0 Beyond the materiality
standards, Cobbs required that "a doctor must also reveal to his
patient such additional information as a skilled practitioner of
good standing would provide under similar circumstances.""'
Based on these standards, it seems unlikely that a physician
must disclose every possible purpose of a test and everything that
could remain undiagnosed if it is refused. A general warning
would seem sufficient. Support for this can be found in
Morgenroth v. Pacific Medical Center, Inc.,112 a post-Cobbs case.
Morgenroth held that "the information that a procedure carries
the risk of death or serious disease in lay language sufficiently ex-
plains the range of complications that might occur. . . ."113 This
holding, taken in conjunction with the holding in Cobbs that a
doctor need not inform of all possible complications," 4 leads to
the conclusion that a doctor may make a general warning as to
the purpose of the proposed diagnostic test. This does not appear
to impose the intolerable burden the Truman dissent claimed it
would.
The impact of Truman on the medical community will not be a
great burden. The doctrine of informed consent is well-known
among physicians, and although Truman extends the doctrine
somewhat, most physicians can be made aware of its implications.
The California Medical Association has attempted to educate its
members on the Cobb decision." 5 The Truman decision should
108. 8 Cal. 3d at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
109. 27 Cal. 3d at 300, 611 P.2d at 911, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
110. 8 Cal. 3d at 244, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 244-45, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
113. 54 Cal. App. 3d 521, 136 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1976) A physician in obtaining con-
sent for a cornary arteriogram told the patient that it carried with it the risk of
death or serious disease but he did not warn of stroke.
114. Id. at 534, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
115. See note 104 supra and accompanying text. "The California Medical Asso-
ciation (CMA) has embarked on an effort to educate its member physicians of the
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be accepted as well.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of California has further extended a physi-
cian's duty of disclosure in Truman v. Thomas. The supreme
court held that a physician must fully disclose the risks to a pa-
tient in failing to undergo a diagnostic test.
In previous case law, a physician only had the duty to warn a
patient of the risks involved in undergoing a treatment or surgical
procedure. Under Truman, it is no longer necessary for the physi-
cian to actually administer treatment to a patient to be held liable
for failing to give a full disclosure. The physician, as a fiduciary,
has the obligation to provide to the patient all information mate-
rial to that patient's decision to accept or reject treatment. Tru-
man, therefore, strengthens the patient's right to decide for
himself what will be done to his own body.
THoMAs M. O'NEIL
significance of the Cobbs decision." Kessenick & Mankin, Medical Malpractice:
The Right to be Informed, 8 U.S.F. L. REV. 261, n.2 (1973). The efforts of the Califor-
nia Medical Association to educate its members of the significance of the Cobbs
decision have included publications by the CMA for summaries and analyses of
Cobbs, and the formation of an Informed Consent Committee to study the impact
of the decision on the medical community. The committee will suggest ways phy-
sicians may protect themselves against liability and assure that the patient re-
ceives all essential information. A check list of risks is being made for the
physician, along with individualized forms in lay language that will inform the,
public of the various procedures. Audio-visual information and explanations on
cassettes are also available. In addition, DocuBooks, published by Health Com-
munications, Inc., provides the lay person with easy to understand printed mate-
rial. Id. at 261-62.
With the result in Truman, it is likely that the CMA will continue its practice of
educating the physician and the patient of the additional warnings required.
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